Abstract-Nowadays, protocols often use time to provide better security. For instance, critical credentials are often associated with expiry dates in system designs. However, using time correctly in protocol design is challenging, due to the lack of time related formal specification and verification techniques. Thus, we propose a comprehensive analysis framework to formally specify as well as automatically verify timed security protocols. A parameterized method is introduced in our framework to handle timing parameters whose values cannot be decided in the protocol design stage. In this work, we first propose timed applied p-calculus as a formal language for specifying timed security protocols. It supports modeling of continuous time as well as application of cryptographic functions. Then, we define its formal semantics based on timed logic rules, which facilitates efficient verification against various authentication and secrecy properties. Given a parameterized security protocol, our method either produces a constraint on the timing parameters which guarantees the security property satisfied by the protocol, or reports an attack that works for any parameter value. The correctness of our verification algorithm has been formally proved. We evaluate our framework with multiple timed and untimed security protocols and successfully find a previously unknown timing attack in Kerberos V.
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INTRODUCTION
T IME is a double edged sword for security protocols. On one hand, time, as a globally shared measurement, provides a simple way to synchronize and coordinate multiple processes. Thus, it is used in many security protocols as a powerful tool. For instance, distance bounding protocols [3] , [4] , [5] use transmission time to measure the distance between protocol participants; interactive protocols [6] , [7] limit the lifetime of messages to achieve better security. In fact, timeout is used almost universally in practice. On the other hand, time also introduces a range of attack surfaces. For instance, a security protocol, whose correctness heavily relies on time, could be broken if the expected timing coordination is compromised; or given a session key with limited lifetime, the adversary might be able to extend its lifetime without proper authorization [8] . As a consequence, we believe that verification of timed security protocols is an important research problem.
Specifically, the time related security of distributed processes relies on various timing constraints, which are designed based on the knowledge of the protocol execution context. For instance, in a message transmission protocol, the message receiver can check the message freshness using a timing constraint t 0 À t p m , where t 0 is the message receiving time, t is the message generation time and p m is the maximum message lifetime. More importantly, the maximum message lifetime p m should be configured based on the knowledge of the minimal network latency p n , among other things. That is, some correlation between p m and p n must be satisfied. In practice, knowing the exact value of the network latency at the protocol design stage is highly nontrivial. Thus, it is desirable if one could leave p m and p n as parameters (symbols with fixed but unknown values) and automatically obtain their secure configurations (timing constraints) that ensure protocol security. The benefit is obvious: having the secure configurations of the above example, for any particular value of the network latency p n observed in practice, the users can easily select a secure (and perhaps more efficient, e.g., in reducing system execution time) value for the maximum message lifetime p m . Compared with the standard verification problem where the values of the parameters are given, computing the secure configurations is more complicated as it boils down to verify timed security protocols for any valuation of the parameters. It is often known as the parameterized verification problem.
In view of the above research problems, in this work, we develop a self-contained framework, which facilitates not only formal specification but also automatic verification of the timed security protocols. It can solve the above-mentioned standard verification problem as well as the parameterized verification problem. It is highly non-trivial because of the following technical challenges. (1) To model the timed security protocols naturally, we need to develop a high-level specification language with time related operations and measurements. Furthermore, in order to facilitate an efficient verification method, it must have a concise and compact low-level semantics. In this way, the timed security protocol can be naturally specified as well as efficiently verified. (2) In the context of vulnerable network such as Internet, where communications are exposed to the adversary, we need to capture the capability of the adversary precisely so as to check the security properties, e.g., the critical information cannot be leaked and the protocol works as intended. (3) Timestamps are continuous values extracted from clocks to ensure the validity of messages and credentials. Analyzing the continuous timing constraints adds another dimension of complexity. (4) A protocol design might contain multiple timing parameters, e.g., the network latency and the session key lifetime, which could affect the its security. Hence, calculating the secure relation among these parameters automatically is far more challenging than verifying the protocol with fixed parameter values.
Contributions. In this work, we first propose a timed applied p-calculusto specify timed security protocols, which extends applied p-calculus [9] with time related operations and measurements. As shown in Section 2, timed applied p-calculus can be used to model timed and untimed security protocols in a natural manner. In particular, symbolic parameters can be specified in the timing constraints. As a result, the protocol correctness can be verified by generating secure configurations on these parameters automatically if possible. Otherwise, an attack shall be identified for arbitrary parameter values. Additionally, secrecy property, non-injective authentication property and injective authentication property can be formally specified in our framework as shown in Section 3.
Given the timed applied p-calculus, we define its semantics based on timed logic rules in Section 4. The adversary is also modeled using a set of timed logic rules, which are originally introduced in [1] , [2] . Since all of the rules can be used for an infinite number of times during the verification, the protocols are verified for an unbounded number of protocol sessions.
Using the timed logic rules, we develop our verification algorithms against different security properties in Section 5. The verification result is (1) either an attack that breaks the security property for any parameter value (2) or a constraint that must be satisfied by the parameters to ensure the security of the protocol. We prove that our verification algorithms always produce correct results.
Finally, we implement our method into a tool named Security Protocol Analyzer (SPA). In order to handle the parameters in the timing constraints, we utilize the Parma Polyhedra Library (PPL) [10] in our tool to represent and to manipulate the timing constraints. We evaluate SPA with several security protocols in Section 6. We have found a time related attack successfully using SPA in the official document of Kerberos V [11] .
Structure of the Paper. In Section 2, we present the timed applied p-calculusas a specification language for modeling timed security protocols. We illustrate the Wide Mouthed Frog (WMF) [6] as a running example. In Section 3, we formally defined authentication and secrecy properties based on the events and processes introduced in timed applied p-calculus. In Section 4, we introduce the timed logic rule [1] , [2] , and use it to define the semantics of the timed applied p-calculus. The verification algorithms are given in Section 5. We prove that our algorithms always give correct results if the verification terminates. The experiment results are shown in Section 6, where a new attack of Kerberos V is found in RFC 4120 [11] . The related works are described in Section 7. Finally, we draw conclusions and discuss future works in Section 8.
TIMED APPLIED p-CALCULUS
In this section, we propose timed applied p-calculus as a specification language for timed protocols. It extends the applied p-calculus [9] with timing related operations and measurements. We use the Wide Mouthed Frog protocol [6] as a running example to demonstrate the language features.
Syntax
Compared with the applied p-calculus, generating, checking and encoding timestamps are allowed in timed applied p-calculus. The syntax of timed applied p-calculus is shown in Table 1 , which consists of five expression categories, i.e., messages, parameters, constraints, configurations and processes. The new structures and expressions are highlighted with the bold font in Table 1 .
Generally, messages represent the data transmitted in the process. They can be composed from functions, names, nonces, variables and timestamps. Functions can be applied to a sequence of messages; names are globally shared constants; nonces are freshly generated random numbers in the processes; timestamps are clock readings extracted during the process execution; and variables are memory spaces for holding messages. Additionally, parameters are pre-configured (timed condition) wait until mt : B then P (timing delay) let x ¼ fðm 1 ; . . .Þ then P [else Q] (function application) cðxÞ:P (channel input) cðmÞ:P (channel output) insert m into db as unique then P (replay checking) initðmÞ@t:P (initialization claim) joinðmÞ@t:P (participation claim) acceptðmÞ@t:P (acceptance claim) secrecyðmÞ:P (secrecy claim)
The expression with the brackets '½E' means that E can be omitted.
constants (e.g., the maximum message lifetime p m ) and persistent environment settings (e.g., the minimal network latency p n ) in the protocol.
Functions can be generally defined as fðm 1 ; m 2 ; . . . ; m n Þ ) m@D,
where f is the function name, m 1 ; m 2 ; . . . ; m n are the input messages, m is the output message and D is the consumable timing range. When m is exactly the same as fðm 1 ; m 2 ; . . . ; m n Þ, we call the function as constructor; otherwise, it is a destructor. For instance, the symmetric encryption function enc s is defined as enc s ðm; kÞ ) enc s ðm; kÞ @½0; 1Þ. It means that a symmetric encryption enc s ðm; kÞ can be generated from a message m and a key k using the function enc s with a non-negative amount of time. For simplicity, we add some syntactic sugar as follows: (1) when D ¼ ½0; 1Þ which is the largest timing range of functions, we omit '@D' in the function definition; (2) for constructors, we omit ') m' in the definition. Then, we can simply write the definition of symmetric encryption as enc s ðm; kÞ. Similarly, the symmetric decryption function dec s can be defined as dec s ðenc s ðm; kÞ; kÞ ) m where m and k have the same meaning as above. For illustration purpose, some frequently used functions are presented in Table 2 . Notice that the input and output messages in the function definition can only be constructors or variables. The constraint set B ¼ CSðt 1 ; t 2 ; . . . ; t n ; p 1 ; p 2 ; . . . ; p m Þ represents a set of linear constraints over timestamps and parameters, which can act as guard conditions and timing assumptions in the protocol. Generally, each constraint can be constructed as
where $2 f < ; g and for any i 2 f1 . . . ng; j 2 f1 . . . mg, a i ; b j ; c are integers. For instance, given the maximum message lifetime p m and the minimal network latency p n , when a message generated at t is received at t 0 , t 0 À t p m can be a timing constraint used by the receiver to check message freshness and t 0 À t ! p n can be a timing constraint enforced by the environment. Additionally, the configuration L ¼ CSðp 1 ; p 2 ; . . . ; p m Þ is a set of linear constraints constituted by only timing parameters. In the above example, the constraint (configuration) p n > 0 should be satisfied to model the physical message transmission delay. Before the verification start, L should be specified with an initial configuration, e.g., p n > 0. Whenever a security violation or a function flaw is found during the verification, we update L with new constraints. Afterwards, L is returned as the verification result, which contains the necessary constraints for both system security and functionality. For instance, p m ! p n should be implied by the verification result, because no message could be deliverable in the network otherwise.
As shown in Table 1 , processes are defined as follows. '0' is the null process that does nothing. 'P jQ' is a parallel composition of processes P and Q. The replication '!P ' stands for an infinite parallel composition of process P , which captures an unbounded number of protocol sessions running in parallel. The nonce generation process 'nn:P ' represents that a fresh nonce n is generated and bound to process P . The clock reading process 'mt:P ' similarly means that a timestamp t is read from the user's clock and bound to process P . The checking condition c in the conditional process 'if c then P else Q' has two forms: 1) the untimed condition m 1 ¼ m 2 is a symbolic equivalence checking between two messages; 2) the timed condition Cðt 1 ; t 2 ; . . . ; t n ; p 1 ; p 2 ; . . . ; p m Þ is a numeric constraint over timestamps and parameters. When the condition c evaluates to true, process P is executed; otherwise, Q is executed. The timing delay process 'wait until mt : B then P ' means that P is executed until the current clock reading satisfies the timing condition B. The function application 'let x ¼ fðm 1 ; . . . ; m n Þ then P else Q' means if the function f is applicable to a sequence of messages m 1 ; . . . ; m n , its result is bound to the variable x in process P ; otherwise, process Q is executed. The channel input 'cðxÞ:P ' means that a message, bound to the variable x, is received from the channel c before executing P . The channel output 'cðmÞ:P ' describes that the message m is sent to the channel c before executing process P . The channel name c can be any message, e.g., names, function applications and nonces. In this work, we use c 0 as the default public channel name. The unique value insertion expression 'insert m into db as unique then P ' is an atomic operation that inserts a message m uniquely into a database named after db. The database can use any message as its name, similar to the channel name. This expression atomically ensures that (1) m does not exist in db before this expression and (2) m is inserted into db after this expression. The unique value insertion expression is particularly useful to prevent replay attacks in practice.
Additionally, the following special events are introduced to specify the security claims.
Right before the initiator finishes its role in starting the protocol, which is usually indicated by sending the last message, it emits initðmÞ@t to indicate its belief (according to the protocol) such that a session has been initiated using the arguments m at time t. When the responder finishes the protocol successfully, it engages acceptðmÞ@t to indicate its belief such that the protocol is accepted under the arguments in m at time t. When other participants join the protocol, they can engage joinðmÞ@t to show their participations in the protocol run with the arguments in m at time t. The protocol participant can engage secrecyðmÞ to indicate that the message m is a secret that should not be known to the adversary unless it is explicitly revealed with by its owner. When the protocol participant intends to to publish a message m that has been claimed as secret with secrecyðmÞ, it can explicitly emit openðmÞ before revealing m. In this work, we verify security protocols against authentication properties and secrecy properties, which are elaborated in Section 3. The authentication properties are specified with the init, join and accept events. The secrecy properties are specified with the secrecy and open events.
When a message is destructed in any process other than the function application process and the destruction fails, the behavior is undefined. Hence, we require that all of the messages (e.g., m, m i ) shown in Table 1 do not contain destructors. In this way, messages can only be destructed by the function f in the function application process.
Notations and Definitions. Several widely accepted notations and definitions are adopted as follows. s ¼ fx 1 between a set and an element is defined as fx 1 ; . . . ; x n g ]y ¼ fx 1 ; . . . ; x n ; yg. A variable x is bound to a process P when x is constructed by the function application process 'let x ¼ fðm 1 ; . . .Þ then P else Q' or the channel input process 'cðxÞ:P ' as shown in Table 1 . When a variable x appears in a process P while it is not bound to P , it is a free variable in P . A process is closed when it does not have any free variable. Notice that all of the processes considered in this work are closed. When x is a tuple in the function application process or the channel input process above, we simply write x as hx 1 ; x 2 ; . . . ; x n i.
Remarks on Processing Time. In this work, every process defined in Table 1 can take arbitrary time to complete. For instance, given P , nk:c 0 ðmÞ:c 0 ðenc s ðm; kÞÞ:0 where c 0 is a public channel, the time consumed between the operations is unknown. If k is generated at t 1 , m is received at t 2 and enc s ðm; kÞ is sent at t 3 , we only have their order preserved by the constraint t 1 < t 2 < t 3 . This is because in practice the operation time can be affected by many runtime factors such as network latency, computing power and execution context switch. Similarly, init, join and accept events can have delays. As a result, the users need to specify the timing using timestamps in these events to indicate their beliefs of the protocol engagements explicitly.
Remarks on Channels. Following applied p-calculus [12] , any message, e.g., names, function applications, noncescan be used as channel names in timed applied p-calculus. However, we recommend the users to specify their network communications using one public channel (public name) for the following reasons. (1) Private channels used in practice are often built with cryptography (encryptions and keys) using one generic network, e.g., wifi networks and internet. Secret keys with cryptography can be used as named private channels, and publicly known names can be used as named public channels. For instance, the protocol participants can use enc s ðhm; ni; kÞ to securely transmit the message m, where k is a pre-shared symmetric session key, enc s is a symmetric encryption function and n is a fresh nonce (as the salt value). In order to build this private channel, the protocol participants could either use existing private channels or key exchange protocols to exchange the key. (2) Explicitly building private channels with cryptography in the protocol models can ensure that the method for building the channels does not introduce security flaws to the protocol in verification. For instance, if the same asymmetric function is used in both of the security protocol and the channel establishment, they may interfere with each other and allow security attacks. (3) In order to provide a strong security guarantee to the verified security protocols, we assume that the network traffics in all of the channels are observable to the adversary. 1 
Running Example: Wide Mouthed Frog
In the following, we use the Wide Mouthed Frog [6] protocol as a running example to illustrate our specification as well as our verification method. WMF is designed to establish a timely fresh session key k from an initiator A to a responder B through a server S. In WMF, whenever a message is received, the receiver checks the message freshness before accepting it. To make a flexible specification, we thus use a parameter p m to represent the maximum message lifetime, ensuring that every message is received within p m . By default, we consider the minimal network delay as a parameter p n . Since p n is a timing parameter related to the network environment, it is not directly used in the protocol specification. Instead, it is a delay that applies to all of the network transmissions. In addition, we assume that the network latency is always positive, which makes the initial parameter configuration as L 0 ¼ fp n > 0g. Notice that a positive network delay is not compulsory in the protocol specification. However, setting the minimal network latency as p n ! 0 sometimes results in a misleading conclusion: the protocol is correct if and only if p n equals to 0. Since the network latency p n is unlikely to be 0 in practice, the security protocol is thus proved as insecure. Because this final step of manual deduction is undesirable, we remove it by simply requiring a positive network latency in the first place.
1. Based on the adversary model (its capabilities) introduced in Section 3.1, the communications in unobservable channels are completely transparent to the adversary. Hence, if an error is introduce by unobservable channels, it is not considered as an attack from the adversary, which is similar to other security protocol verification works, e.g., [13] , [14] . More importantly, considering channels as observable in general can find strictly more security attacks if they exist. Hence, we assume that all of the channels are observable to the adversary in this work. If some unobservable channels are used in the protocol for special purpose, we assume that the protocol designers have ensured their correctness. Then, we can model the messages transmitted in these channels as correctly delivered.
The WMF protocol is a key exchange protocol that involves three participants, e.g., an initiator Alice, a responder Bob and a server S. Alice and Bob register their usernames as A and B at the server respectively. The generated key of a user u is written as keyðuÞ, where key is a secret function. WMF then can be informally described as the following three steps.
(1) A generates a random session key k at t a A ! S : hA; enc s ðht a ; B; ki; keyðAÞÞi (2) S receives the request from A at t s S checks : t s À t a p m S ! B
: enc s ðht s ; A; ki; keyðBÞÞ (3) B receives the message from S at t b B checks : t b À t s p m B accepts the session key k First, A generates a fresh key k at time t a and initiates the WMF protocol with B by sending the message hA; enc s ðht a ; B; ki; keyðAÞÞi to the server. Second, after receiving the request from A, the server ensures the message freshness by checking the timestamp t a and accepts her request by sending a new message enc s ðht s ; A; ki; keyðBÞÞ to B, informing him that the server receives a request from A at time t s to communicate with him using the key k. Third, B checks the message freshness again and accepts the request from A if the message is received timely. All of the transmitted messages are encrypted under the users' long-term keys that are pre-registered at the server.
In order to verify WMF in a hostile environment, we assume that (1) the adversary can decide the protocol responder for A, (2) the adversary controls the participation time of all entities in the protocol, (3) S provides its session key exchange service to all of its registered users and (4) the adversary can register as any user at the server, except for A and B. The precise attacker model employed in our work is discussed in Section 3. In WMF, because we are only interested in the protocol acceptance between the legitimate users, we ask B to only accept the requests from A. Additionally, a public channel c 0 controlled by the adversary is used in this protocol for network communication.
Before the protocol starts, all of its participants need to register a secret long-term key at the server. We assume that A and B have already registered at the server using their names. Hence, the server can generate new keys for any other user (personated by the adversary), which can be shown as the process P r below P r , c 0 ðuÞ:ifu 6 ¼ A^u 6 ¼ B then c 0 ðkeyðuÞÞ:0:
In WMF, A takes a role of the initiator as specified by P a below. She first starts the protocol by receiving a responder's name r from c 0 , assuming that r can be specified by the adversary. Then, A generates a session key k and claims k should be unknown to the adversary. Later, A records the clock reading t a and emits an init event to indicate the protocol initialization with the protocol arguments m a at t a . Notice that m a will be instantiated in Section 3 according to specific authentication properties. Finally, the message hA; enc s ðht a ; r; ki; keyðAÞÞi is sent from A to S. Since the initialization time t a , the responder's namer r and the session key k are encrypted with A's long-term key, which is only known to A and the server, we may believe that they are inaccessible to the adversary P a , c 0 ðrÞ:nk:secrecyðkÞ:mt a :initðm a Þ@t a :
if r ¼ B then c 0 ðhA; enc s ðht a ; r; ki; keyðAÞÞiÞ:0 else openðkÞ:c 0 ðhA; enc s ðht a ; r; ki; keyðAÞÞiÞ:0:
As specified by the process P s , after the server receives a user's request as a tuple hi; xi, the current time is recorded as t s and the key keyðiÞ is used to decrypt x. If the decryption function applies successfully, it stores the initialization time, the responder's name and the session key into t i , r and k respectively. When the freshness checking t s À t i p m is passed, the server then believes its participation in a protocol run at time t s . Similar to the init event, we specify the argument m s in Section 3. Later, a new message encrypted by the responder's key, written as enc s ðht s ; i; ki; keyðrÞÞ, is sent to the responder over the public channel Finally, we have a process P p that broadcasts the public names of Alice and Bob P p , c 0 ðAÞ:c 0 ðBÞ:0:
The overall process P is the parallel composition of the infinite replications of the five processes described above P , ð!P r Þjð!P a Þjð!P s Þjð!P b Þjð!P p Þ:
TIMED SECURITY PROPERTIES
In this work, we discuss two security properties, i.e., authentication and secrecy. In order to define them, we introduce the formal adversary model first.
Adversary Model
We assume that an active attacker exists in the network, whose capability is extended from the Dolev-Yao model [15] . The attacker can intercept all communications, compute new messages, generate new nonces and send the obtained messages. For computation, it can use all the publicly available functions, e.g., encryption, decryption, concatenation. He can also ask the genuine protocol participants to take part in the protocol whenever he needs to. Comparing our attack model with the Dolev-Yao model, attacking weak cryptographic functions and compromising legitimate protocol participants are allowed. A formal definition of the adversary model in timed applied p-calculus is as follows.
Definition 1 (Adversary Process).
The adversary process is defined as an arbitrary closed timed applied p-calculus process K which does not emit special events, i.e., init, join, accept, secrecy and open.
Timed Authentication
In a protocol, we often have an initiator who starts the protocol and a responder who accepts the protocol. For instance, in WMF, Alice is the initiator and Bob is the responder. Additionally, other entities, who are called partners, can be involved during the protocol execution, such as the server in WMF. Given all of the protocol participants, the protocol authentication generally aims at establishing some common knowledge among them when the protocol successfully ends.
Since different participants take different roles in the protocol, we introduce the following three events for the initiator, the responder and the partners respectively. In these events, the message m stands for the arguments used in the current protocol session and the timestamp t represents the timing of the authentication claim. Examples are presented later in this section for different types of authentication.
The protocol initiator emits initðmÞ@t when he/she initializes the protocol. The protocol responder engages acceptðmÞ@t to claim that he/she finishes the protocol. The protocol partners emit joinðmÞ@t to indicate his/her participation in the protocol. The occurrence of an event means that the protocol participant believes his/her participation of the corresponding role in a protocol run. Hence, the above events should be engaged immediately after the protocol participants successfully process all of the received messages according to their roles, as their knowledge of the protocol execution state cannot be increased after this point.
Based on the init, join and accept events, the protocol authentication properties then can be formally specified as event correspondences, i.e., the non-injective and injective timed authentication. Additionally, when particular arguments are specified in the events, their correspondence can be further categorized into an agreement property or a synchronization property.
Given a timed security protocol, the timed non-injective authentication is satisfied if and only if for every acceptance of the protocol responder, the protocol initiator indeed initiates the protocol and the protocol partners indeed join in the protocol, agreeing on the protocol arguments and timing requirements. We formally define the non-injective timed authentication as follows.
Definition 2 (Non-injective Timed Authentication). The non-injective timed authentication, denoted as
is satisfied by a closed process P , if and only if, given the adversary process K, for every occurrence of an accept event in P jK, the corresponding init event and join events in Q n have occurred before in P jK, agreeing on the arguments in the events and the constraints in B.
The injective timed authentication additionally requires an injective correspondence between the protocol initialization and acceptance comparing with the non-injective timed authentication. Hence, the injective timed authentication, which ensures the infeasibility of replay attack, is strictly stronger than the non-injective one.
Definition 3 (Injective Timed Authentication). The injective timed authentication, denoted as
is satisfied by a closed process P , if and only if, (1) the noninjective timed authentication
is satisfied by P ; (2) given the adversary process K, for every init event of Q i occurred in P jK, at most one accept event can occur in P jK, agreeing on the arguments in the events and the constraints in B.
For simplicity, given a non-injective query Q n ¼ accept ½B À H and its injective version Q i ¼ accept ½ B ! H, we have injðQ n Þ ¼ Q i and non injðQ i Þ ¼ Q n . Similarly, given two query sets Q n and Q i respectively, we have injðQ n Þ ¼ Q i and non injðQ i Þ ¼ Q n .
Timed Agreement Properties. When the message m encoded in the authentication events stands for the common knowledge established by the protocol among the participants, we call these timed authentication properties as timed agreement properties. The non-injective and injective timed agreement properties generally ensure that certain common knowledge is established among the protocol participants under the timing restrictions. Example 1. In WMF, when B accepts the protocol, the common knowledge established among A, S and B should be the initiator's name, the responder's name and the session key. Hence, we specify the message m in different processes of WMF as follows:
The non-injective timed agreement then can be written as Q na ¼ acceptðhi; r; kiÞ@t r ½ t s À t i p m^tr À t s p m À initðhi; r; kiÞ@t i ; joinðhi; r; kiÞ@t s .
(
Similarly, we have the injective one as Q ia ¼ injðQ na Þ.
Timed Synchronization Properties. However, the timed agreement properties do not necessarily guarantee the faithful message transmissions between protocol participants, so the messages received by the receiver may not be the same message sent by the sender in the protocol. Based on the synchronization defined in [16] , when the message m encoded in the authentication events reflects the network input and output correspondence, we name these timed authentication properties after timed synchronization properties. The synchronization properties ensure that the messages transmitted in the protocol are untampered, so the message received by the receiver is the message sent from the sender for every network transmission. Then, we specify the input and output correspondence in the non-injective timed synchronization property, written as follows:
initðhr; a2siÞ@t i ; joinðha2s; s2biÞ@t s :
Notice that 'a2s' is the message sent from A to S and 's2b' is the message sent from S to B. Similarly, we have the injective timed synchronization Q is ¼ injðQ ns Þ.
Secrecy
When a message m satisfies secrecy property, it often means that m cannot be known to the adversary. However, in some special protocols such as commitment protocols [17] , [18] , we need a stronger secrecy property because the secret owner may reveal the secret at some protocol stage intentionally. Hence, we define message secrecy as a conditional property [19] , i.e., the message should not be known to the adversary before its owner intentionally reveals it. Hence, in timed applied p-calculus, before the secret owner reveals a secret m, he/she must explicitly engages an openðmÞ event.
The secrecy property can be clearly illustrated and motivated by commitment protocols [18] anaylzed in Section 6.2. In this work, the secrecy property can be defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Secrecy Property).
The secrecy property, denoted as Q s ¼ secrecyðmÞ, is satisfied by a closed process P , if and only if for any adversary process K, m cannot be sent to the public before openðmÞ has been engaged in P jK.
Remarks on Secrecy and Open Claims. In this work, comparing with the secrecy property defined in [12] , we additionally introduced two secrecy and open events to specified the secrecy property in the processes. In the following, we illustrate the reasons of introducing these events using the protocol role of Alice in WMF as an example. Based on the original protocol specification of WMF, the protocol role of the initiator Aliceshould be specified as P oa as follows: P oa , c 0 ðrÞ:nk:mt a :c 0 ðhA; enc s ðht a ; r; ki; keyðAÞÞiÞ:0:
In P oa , (1) when the protocol responder claims to be Bob (r ¼ B), the secrecy property of key k should be preserved, which is the verification goal; (2) when the protocol responder is a user controlled by the adversary, k becomes known to the adversary trivially, which does not affect the correctness of the protocol. Hence, we can conclude the secrecy property of k in WMF as: k should not be known to the adversary when the responder claims to be Bob, a benign responder. It means that the secrecy property is a conditional property.
However, the secrecy property defined in [12] (a message m satisfies secrecy if and only if m cannot be known to the adversary) is not conditional. Hence, the security protocols need to be modified in some manner to reflect this condition. For instance, in [13] , the specified protocol can only be finished by benign users, and the protocol role of Alice in WMF needs be changed to P ma as follows:
if r ¼ B then c 0 ðhA; enc s ðht a ; r; ki; keyðAÞÞiÞ:0 else 0:
In P ma , the adversary cannot obtain the messages hA; enc s ðht a ; r; ki; keyðAÞÞi when r 6 ¼ B. Since they should be known to the adversary in the original WMF protocol, attacks could be missed.
As a result, we introduce the secrecy event in the process calculus to claim the secrecy property based on the execution conditions. When a secrecyðmÞ event is engaged in a process, m instantiated in the current process branch should satisfy the secrecy property. Then, the protocol role of Alice in WMF could be modeled as P sa P sa , c 0 ðrÞ:nk:mt a :if r ¼ B then secrecyðkÞ:c 0 ðhA; enc s ðht a ; r; ki; keyðAÞÞiÞ:0 else c 0 ðhA; enc s ðht a ; r; ki; keyðAÞÞiÞ:0:
Notice that P sa does not use the open event as P a did in Section 2.2. Both of P sa and P a are correct specification for the protocol role of Alice in WMF when authentication is not considered.
In this work, we introduce the open event for additional specification flexibility, which is illustrated by P a in Section 2.2. The open event stands for the explicit revealing behavior from the benign protocol participants. Given a secret message m with secrecyðmÞ claimed previously, if m is known to the adversary after openðmÞ has been engaged, the secrecy property of m still holds. This is especially useful where secrets can be revealed to the adversary at a later stage in the protocol. For instance, in some commitment protocols, e.g., [17] , a commitment commitðm; oÞ can be made by a user U to a public message m with a secret open value o. During the protocol execution, commitðm; oÞ will be sent to the public as a commitment claim, while the open value o should stay as secret at this stage. Later, when U wants to prove that he/she is the one who made the commitment commitðm; oÞ, U can actively reveal the open value o as a proof. Since the open value is not known to the others (including the adversary) before it is revealed in the commitment protocol, it can act as a proof to the commitment. In the commitment protocol, an important property is that the open value o should stay as secret before it is explicitly revealed, which can be specified using the secrecy and open events with ease. For illustration purpose, a simplified version of the commitment protocol P cm can be modeled as follows: 
TIMED LOGIC RULES
In this section, we first introduce timed logic rules to specify the timed security protocols, which facilitate efficient verification as shown in Section 5. Then, we define the semantics of the timed applied p-calculus based on the timed logic rules.
Timed Logic Rule
Analyzing the timed security protocols using the timed applied p-calculus directly is unfortunately inconvenient, because of its conditional branches, name bindings, etc. Hence, in this section, we introduce timed logic rules as the semantics of timed applied p-calculus to represent the attack capabilities of the adversary that facilitate efficient protocol analysis. However, since we need to describe the message types without concrete processes, we introduce notations to differentiate constants, nonces, timestamps, variables and parameters as shown in Table 3 . (1) The syntax of variables and functions are unchanged. (2) Constants are appended with a pair of square brackets from A to A½. (3) Nonces are put inside of a pair of square brackets from n to ½n. (4) Timestamps are written with a blackboard bold font from t to t. (5) Parameters are prefixed with x from p to xp. Generally, each capability of the adversary is specified as a timed logic rule in the following form:
G is a set of untimed guards, fe 1 ; e 2 ; . . . ; e n g is a set of premise events, B is a set of timing constraints and e is a conclusion event. It means that if the untimed guard condition G, the premise events fe 1 ; e 2 ; . . . ; e n g and the timing constraints B are satisfied, the conclusion event is ready to occur. The timed and untimed conditions are extracted from the execution trace from the beginning of the process to the current execution point. We discuss their extraction later. When G is empty, we simply omit '½G' in the rule.
The events represent the things that can occur in the protocol. In the timed logic rules, several types of events are introduced as shown in Table 3 . Similar to timed applied p-calculus, we have init, join and accept events that denote the authentication claims made by the legitimate protocol participants. The init, join events are premises and the accept events are conclusions. However, their notations have been changed as follows:
initðmÞ@t ! initð½id; m; tÞ joinðmÞ@t ! joinð½id; m; tÞ acceptðmÞ@t ! acceptð½id; m; tÞ:
The additional nonce ½id represents the session id, which is specifically introduced to check the injective authentication properties.
In order to verify the secrecy property with event reachability checking, we introduce leakðmÞ as an opposite event of secrecyðmÞ, standing for the revealing of the secret message m. For every secrecyðmÞ claimed in the process, we fork a parallel sub-process 'c 0 ðxÞ:if x ¼ m then leakðmÞ:0', where c 0 is a public channel name. It receives a message x from the network, compares it with m and claims leakðmÞ if x ¼ m. In this way, we reduce a verification problem of message secrecy to a reachability analysis of the leak event. Furthermore, when a secret message m is revealed by its owner with intention, an openðmÞ event should exist in the rule premises. The open event in the timed logic rule has the same meaning and syntax in the timed applied p-calculus. For every openðmÞ event engaged in the process, an openðmÞ event is added into the rule premises, indicating m is revealed willingly. As a result, if a leakðmÞ event is reachable without having an openðmÞ event as its premises, the secrecy property of m is violated.
In addition, as shown in Table 3 , we have the following new events. First, knowðm; tÞ means that the adversary possesses the message m at time t. Because the adversary observes all of the channel communications, for every network input 'cðxÞ' at time t, we add knowðhc; xi; t 0 Þ satisfying t 0 t to the premises. It means that the adversary needs to know c and x before it can send x to c at time t. Similarly, for every network output 'cðmÞ' at time t, we construct a rule that concludes knowðm; t m Þ with an additional premise of knowðc; t c Þ, satisfying t m À t ! xp n^tc t. It means that the message m transmitted in the channel c at t can be intercepted by the adversary after the network delay xp n if it knows the channel name c before t. Second, given a unique value insertion process 'insert m into db as unique then P ', we add uniqueðm; db; hÞ into the premises means that the message u is a unique value inserted into the database db. The pair hm; dbi is thus globally unique, acting as an identification of the process replication history h. The process replication history consists of the network inputs, generated nonces and read timestamps in the current process replication in the chronological order. Third, given a nonce generation process 'nn:P ', we add both of newð½n; l½Þ and uniqueð½n; l½; hÞ to the rule premises, denoting the generation of nonce ½n at the process location l½, where h is the process replication history. Notice that the process replication history h ends when the null process 0 or the replication process !P is reached. The location name l½ is generated by a special function locðÞ, which returns a unique location name for every process. For instance, given P 0 , !c 0 ðxÞ:nsk:c 0 ðsignðx; skÞÞ:0, where c 0 is a public channel, we can rewrite P 0 as follows:
P 0 , !P 1 P 1 , c 0 ðxÞ:P 2 P 2 , nsk:P 3 P 3 , c 0 ðsignðx; skÞÞ:P 4 P 4 , 0:
The function locðÞ returns a unique name for each process P i where i 2 ½0 . . . 4 .
Since we assume that different nonces must have different values, every rule can have at most one new event for every single nonce. When two new events have the same nonce in a rule, we merge them into a single event. Similarly, we need to merge other events in the following scenarios: know events presented in a rule for the same message; unique events with the same value and database; init, join and accept events with the same session id; etc. Thus, we introduce signature to events as shown in Table 3 , event signature can be constructed by concatenating its event name with a sequence of messages that prefixed with '?'. For instance, in the event uniqueð?m; ?db; mÞ, the message m and the database db is prefixed by ?, so its signature is 'unique:m:db', where '.' concatenates and separates the strings.
To provide a better understanding of the timed logic rules, we show the following examples.
Example 3. For every pubic names in the protocol specification, they should be known to the adversary by default. In WMF, the public channel c 0 is public known. We thus have the following rule À½ !knowðc 0 ½; tÞ:
We recommend that the public channel name should be the only public name in the protocol specification. t u Example 4. Given that the symmetric encryption function enc s is public, the adversary can use it to encrypt messages. In order to use this function, the adversary first need to know a message m and a key k for encryption. Then, the encryption function can return the encrypted message enc s ðm; kÞ. Hence, the encryption can be represented as the following rule: knowðm; t 1 Þ; knowðk; t 2 Þ À½ t 1 t^t 2 t ! knowðenc s ðm; kÞ; tÞ:
Notice that the timing constraints means that enc s ðm; kÞ can only be known to the adversary after m and k are known, following the chronological order. t u Example 5. In WMF, the server provides its key registration service to the public as follows. Then, the server's service can be written as follows: ½u 6 ¼ A½^u 6 ¼ B½ knowðu; t 1 Þ; knowðc 0 ½; t 2 Þ À½ t À t 1 ! xp n^t2 t ! knowðkeyðuÞ; tÞ:
It means that the adversary can register secret keys at the server over c 0 using any name other than A and B. The additional nonce ½n b is introduced as the session id of P b . Since ½n b is a random number that is unique globally, its value can identify the current session, including the network input x, the recorded timestamp t b , and the generated nonce n b in the process. We show how the nonce can be used to identify the session as follows. When two nonces in a single rule have the same value ½n and one of them is generated in P b , we shall have newð½n; bob½Þ and newð½n; xÞ in the rule. Since they have the same signature new:½n, they must be unifiable with fx7 !bob½g. So, the other nonce is generated in P b as well. Then, the corresponding unique events have the same signature and thus must be unifiable. As a result, they are generated in the same process replication. t u
Semantic Definitions of Timed Applied p-Calculus
The timed logic rules facilitate efficient protocol verification because they represent the attack capabilities of the adversary in a straightforward manner. Hence, we define the semantics of timed applied p-calculus based on the timed logic rules. Semantics of Functions. Given a function written in timed applied p-calculus in the following form:
The timed logic rules can be accordingly written as follows: knowðm 1 ; t 1 Þ; knowðm 2 ; t 2 Þ; . . . ; knowðm n ; t n Þ À½ 8i 2 f1 . . . ng : t À t i 2 D ! knowðm; tÞ:
It means that the adversary can obtain the function result after a certain time in D, when he/she knows all the function inputs. Semantics of Processes. Given a process in timed applied p-calculus, its execution forms various context information, including generated nonces, timestamps, security claims, validated conditions and network communications. Thus, we need to keep the track of these execution contexts in order to define its semantics. In general, the context of a process P is a tuple ht l ; f; r; G; H; B; si where t l is the most recently generated timestamp before the execution of P . We use it to maintain a chronological order of all generated timestamps, i.e., for any newly generated timestamp t, we have t l t. f is a variable representing the full execution trace of the current process that can be identified by the nonces generated in P . The execution trace consists of network inputs, read timestamps and generated
H is a set of premise events before P . B is a set of timing constraints that leads to P . s is a substitution that is applicable to P . Given a process P and its contexts ht l ; f; r; G; H; B; si, the timed logic rules extracted from P can be denoted as bP ct l frGHBs. These timed logic rules represent the capabilities of the adversary, as illustrated in Section 4.1. Since we target at verifying timed security protocols with an unbounded number of sessions, when a protocol P 0 is specified in the timed applied p-calculus as shown in Section 2, the specification and verification are actually based on 'mt 0 :!P 0 ', where t 0 is the starting time of the whole process. Then, the semantic rule generation can be fired as bP 0 ct 0 f 0 f 0 ;;U;, where f 0 is a variable representing the trace of P 0 .
First, we discuss three types of processes that either terminate the current session or fork sub-sessions. They are the null process '0', the parallel composition process 'P jQ' and the replication process '!P '. Since the current session is completed when the null process 0 is reached, no rule is defined. Given the parallel composition process 'P jQ' as the next process, nonces generated before P jQ can identify both traces of P and Q; nonces generated in P (Q resp.) can only identify the trace of P (Q resp.). Hence, when r is the trace of P jQ, r p is the trace of P and r q is the trace of Q, r is mapped to hr p ; r q i in P jQ, r is mapped to r p in P and r is mapped to r q in Q. When the infinite process replication '!P ' is the next process, nonces generated before !P cannot identify P ; nonces generated in P can identify P . Hence, when r is the trace of !P and r p is the trace of P , r is mapped to a constant ? (representing the end of the trace) in !P ; r and r p are the same in P b0ct l frGHBs ¼ ; bP jQct l frGHBs ¼ bP ct l fr p GðH Á s Á fr 7 ! hr p ; r q igÞBðs Á fr 7 ! r p gÞ
[ bQct l fr q GðH Á s Á fr 7 ! hr p ; r q igÞBðs Á fr 7 ! r q gÞ b!P ct l frGHBs ¼ bP ct l frGðH Á s Á fr 7 ! ?gÞBs:
Second, when the nonce or timestamp generation process is encountered, we append the nonce or timestamp to the end of the execution trace. For the nonce generation process, we add a new event to H for the nonce generation and insert a unique event to H for its uniqueness, where locðÞ returns the current location name in the process. For the timestamp generation process, we add a timing constraint to describe the chronological order of timestamps as well as a know event to show that the adversary can control the timing of process execution
Third, four conditional expressions exist in the timed applied p-calculus. The equivalence checking between messages should be included in G, while the timing constraints should be added to B. The timing delay expression first reads the current timing and then checks the timing constraints. The function application process computes the function result and stores it into a variable. Notice that we do not consider the function application delay in the process, because the computation delay specified in the function definition aims at describing the adversary rather than the legitimate protocol participants. Since we can insert additional timing delay into the process whenever necessary, the protocol can be specified more flexibly and accurately in this manner Fourth, network communications can happen in the timed applied p-calculus. For every network input, we record the time when it is received and add a know event into the premises, indicating that the adversary must be able to send the message using the channel. Similarly, we generate a time logic rule for every network output, representing that the message will be known to the adversary when it is sent using a channel known to the adversary Fifth, we can check the uniqueness of messages in the process, which is useful for preventing replay attacks and thus ensure injective timed authentication. In practice, the uniqueness checking is usually implemented by maintaining a database and comparing the new values with the existing ones binsert m into db as unique then P ct l frGHBs ¼ bP ct l frGðH ] uniqueðm; db; fÞÞBs:
Sixth, three types of authentication events can be engaged in the process. In order to check the injective authentication properties, we introduce an additional nonce ½id to represent the session id in the authentication events. The corresponding new and unique events for the new nonce ½id are added as well, where locðÞ returns the current location name in the process. The init and join events are added into the rule premises. The accept events act as the rule conclusions Seventh, the last two processes in the timed applied p-calculus is for the secrecy claim. The secrecy property is checked as an absence of information leakage during the verification in Section 5, so a new event leakðmÞ is introduced as a contradiction against secrecyðmÞ. Additionally, if an openðmÞ is engaged before leakðmÞ, we deem the leakage of m as intended by its owner 
After we remove the unrelated timestamps t 0 and t 1 , rename the timestamp t 0 1 into t 1 , and rewrite the execution trace from a binary tree hm 1 ; hm 2 ; . . . hm n ; rii . . .i into a message tuple hm 1 ; m 2 ; . . . ; m n i, the automatically extracted semantic rule becomes identical to the previously manually constructed rule. t u Remarks on Execution Traces. In the automatically generated rules, the execution trace hm 1 ; m 2 ; . . . ; m n i is represented as a binary tree structure hm 1 ; hm 2 ; . . . hm n ; rii . . .i for its extendable nature. For instance, suppose we have a process P xs as follows: When the first value value 1 ðu; s 1 Þ is sent in P , the execution trace is trace 1 ¼ hx; s 1 i. When the second value value 2 ðu; s 2 Þ is sent in P , the execution trace is updated to 
VERIFICATION ALGORITHM
After obtaining the initial timed logic rules denoted as IR init from the timed applied p-calculus process as shown in Section 4, the satisfaction of the security properties then can be verified using the algorithms presented in this section. Generally, after specifying an initial parameter configuration L 0 , our verification method iteratively tries to find attacks and then updates the parameter configuration to remove the attacks. In the end, our approach can either compute the parameter configurations that make the protocol satisfy all of the security properties or report that no secure parameter configuration can be found. Given a rule R in the form of ½GH À½ B ! e, a set of rules IR and a parameter configuration L, we use aðR; LÞ ¼ ½GH À½ B^L ! e and aðIR; LÞ ¼ faðR; LÞjR 2 IRg to represent the rules under the configuration L. Specifically, the verification is divided into two sequential phases: the rule basis construction phase and the query searching phase. In the rule base construction phase, we generate new rules by composing two rules (through unifying the conclusion of the first rule and the premise of the second rule). Our verification algorithm uses this method repeatedly to generate new rules until a fixed-point is reached. This fixed-point is called the rule basis if it exists. Subsequently, in the query searching phase, the query is checked against the rule basis to find attacks. The verification either proves the correctness of the protocol by providing secure configurations of the parameters (represented as succinct constraints), or reports attacks if no secure parameter configuration can be found. Since verifying security protocols is undecidable [20] , our algorithm cannot guarantee termination. However, as shown in Section 6, our algorithm terminates on most of the evaluated security protocols, which is similar to other security protocol verification works such as [13] , [21] , [22] . Additionally, we adopted an on-thefly approach that checks the security properties (in the second phase) as soon as a rule is generated (in the first phase), so we could terminate early when no secure parameter configuration can be found. Moreover, limiting the number of protocol sessions is allowed in our framework which would guarantee the termination of our algorithm.
Rule Basis Construction
Before constructing the rule basis, we need to introduce two operators first: 
Given two rules R ¼ ½GH À½
The rule basis bðIR init Þ is constructed based on the initial rules IR init . First, we define IR v to represent the minimal closure of IR init based on the rule composition and the rule implication as follows. (1 First, we define the derivation tree as follows. When a derivation tree exists for a rule R based on a set of rules IR, we say that R is derivable from IR.
Definition 5. Derivation Tree. Let IR be a set of closed rules and R be a closed rule (a closed rule is a rule with its conclusion initiated by its premises). Let R be a rule in the form of ½Ge 1 ; . . . ; e n À½ B ! e. R can be derived from IR if and only if there exists a finite derivation tree satisfying the following conditions:
(1) edges in the tree are labeled by events; (2) nodes are labeled by the rules in IR; (3) if a node labeled by R has incoming edges of e 0 1 ; . . . ; e 0 n and an outgoing edge of e 0 , satisfying the untimed condition G 0 and the timed condition B 0 , then R ) ½G 0 e 0 1 ; . . . ; e 0 n À½ B 0 ! e 0 ; (4) the outgoing edge of the root is the event e; (5) the incoming edges of the tree leaves are e 1 ; . . . ; e n . Additionally, G is the conjunction of all the untimed conditions in the derivation tree, and B is the conjunction of all the timed conditions in the derivation tree. We name this tree as the derivation tree of R based on IR. Theorem 1 means that we can derive the same set of rules from aðIR init ; LÞ and aðbðIR init Þ; LÞ. However, since the premises of the rules in aðbðIR init Þ; LÞ are trivially satisfiable by the definition of the function b, the attack searching based on aðbðIR init Þ; LÞ would be much easier. In order to prove Theorem 1, we prove the following two lemmas first. is defined and
There should exist a substitution s such that e t Á s ¼ e o , Proof. (only if) Assuming R is derivable from IR init , there exists a derivation tree T i for S on IR init . Since we have 8R 2 IR init ; 9R 0 2 IR v ; R 0 ) R, we can replace all the labels of nodes in T i with rules in IR v and get a new derivation tree T v . Because some of the rules are filtered out from IR v to bðIR init Þ when their premises do not all belong to V, we further need to prove that the nodes in T v can be composed together until a derivation tree T b is formed so that all the nodes in T b are labeled by rules in bðIR init Þ.
To continue our proof, we assume that there exist two nodes n and n 0 in T v and they are linked by an edge e 0 as shown in Fig. 1 . We should have R; R 0 2 IR v such that R ) ½GH À½ B ! e, R 0 ) ½G 0 H 0 À½ B 0 ! e 0 and e 2 H 0 . Because ð½GH À½ B ! eÞ and ð½G 0 H 0 À½ B 0 ! e 0 Þ can be composed on the event e, according to Lemma 1, we could merge these two nodes into one node based on the two different cases given in the proof of Lemma 1. Let R o ¼ ð½GH À½ B ! eÞ e ð½G 0 H 0 À½ B 0 ! e 0 Þ. In the first case, because IR v is the fixed-point of the service composition, there should exist R t 2 IR v such that R t ) R o . In the second case, we can remove the node n and link its incoming links directly to the n 0 , so that the new node n 0 is still implied by a rule R t 2 IR v . We could continuously replace the nodes in the derivation tree until no node can be further processed and we denote the new tree as T .
For every node in T , we prove the rules labeled to the nodes are in bðIR init Þ as follows.
For the leaves of the tree, their incoming edges are labeled by the facts in V. So the leaves are labeled by rules in bðIR init Þ.
For an inner node n 0 of the tree with all its children's rule premises in V. Because n 0 cannot composed by its children, the premises of the rule labeled to n 0 should also be in V. So the rules labeled to all the inner nodes are in bðIR init Þ. As a consequence, all the nodes in T are labeled by rules in bðIR init Þ, so R is derivable from bðIR init Þ.
(if) For every rule in IR v , it should be composed from existing rules, which is in turn composed from IR init . Thus all the rules in IR v should be derivable from IR init . In the meanwhile, bðIR init Þ does not include any extra rule except for the existing rules in IR v , so 8R 2 bðIR init Þ, R is derivable from IR init . t u Based on the above two lemmas, we can then prove Theorem 1 as follows.
Proof of Theorem 1. Given a derivation tree T of R, we define GðT; LÞ as a derivation tree where every node's label R 0 is replaced with aðR 0 ; LÞ. According to Lemma 2, R ¼ ½GH À½ B ! e is derivable from IR init if and only if R is derivable from bðIR init Þ. It means that we can construct a derivation tree T of R based on IR init if and only if we can construct a derivation tree T 0 of R based on bðIR init Þ. After applying the configuration L to all of the labels of T , we have the following two conditions. If B^L 6 ¼ ;, GðT; LÞ becomes a derivation tree of aðR; LÞ based on aðIR init ; LÞ, and GðT 0 ; LÞ becomes a derivation tree of aðR; LÞ based on aðbðIR init Þ; LÞ. If B^L ¼ ;, aðR; LÞ becomes invalid, so both of GðT; LÞ and GðT 0 ; LÞ do not exist. Hence, aðR; LÞ is derivable from aðIR init ; LÞ if and only if aðR; LÞ is derivable from aðbðIR init Þ; LÞ. The theorem is then proved. t u
Query Searching
In the following, we present how to verify security properties based on aðbðIR init Þ; LÞ. A rule disproves non-injective authentication if and only if its conclusion event is an accept event, while it does not require all the init and join events as premises or it has looser timing constraints comparing with those in the query. On the other hand, it is an obedience to Q n denoted as Q n ' R if and only if G 6 ¼ false^B 6 ¼ ;, e and accept are unifiable with the most general unifier s such that 8e 0 2 H; e 0 2 V and 9s
Furthermore, an injective authentication is violated if and only if two conditions are satisfied. First, there exists a contradiction to the non-injective version of the query. Second, given two obedience rules to the non-injective version of the query, when the corresponding init events have identical session ids, the accept events in these two rules are not necessarily the same. The second condition means that a single init event can correspond to two different accept events, which violates the injective authentication property.
Definition 7 (Injective Authentication Contradiction).
Given a pair of rules hR; R 0 i , it is a contradiction to the injective authentication query Q i ¼ accept ½ B 0 ! init; J 0 denoted as Q i 0 hR; R 0 i if and only if (1) R and R 0 are obedience rules to non injðQ i Þ; (2) when the corresponding init events in R and R 0 have the same session id, the accept events of R and R 0 do not necessarily have the same session id.
Finally, a rule is a contradiction to the secrecy query when the leak event is reachable without engaging its corresponding open event before.
Definition 8 (Secrecy Contradiction). A rule R ¼ ½GH
À½B ! e is a contradiction to the secrecy query Q s ¼ secrecyðmÞ denoted as Q s 0 R if and only if G 6 ¼ false, B 6 ¼ ;, leakðmÞˆs e, openðmÞ Á s 6 2 H and 8e 0 2 H : e 0 2 V.
During the verification, we must ensure that no contradiction exists for all queries while at least one obedience rule exists for every non-injective authentication query. Hence, given non-injective authentication queries Q n , injective authentication queries Q i and secrecy queries Q s , our goal is to compute the largest L that satisfies the following three conditions: In order to prove the correctness of our algorithm, we need to show that for any configuration L, a contradiction exists in aðbðIR init Þ; LÞ if and only if it exists in aðIR init ; LÞ. 
end
end for When Q is a secrecy query or a non-injective authentication query, there exists R derivable from aðIR init ; LÞ such that Q 0 R if and only if there exists R 0 2 aðbðIR init Þ; LÞ such that Q 0 R 0 . When Q is an injective authentication query, there exists R 1 and R 2 derivable from aðIR init ; LÞ such that Q 0 hR 1 ; R 2 i if and only if there exists R LÞ, according to Theorem 1, they are derivable from aðIR init ; LÞ. Hence, any contradiction found in aðbðIR init Þ; LÞ is a contradiction derivable from the initial rules aðIR init ; LÞ. Partial Completeness. (1) When Q is a secrecy query or a non-injective authentication query, suppose we have a rule R derivable from aðIR init ; LÞ such that Q 0 R. According to Theorem 1, R is also derivable from aðbðIR init Þ; LÞ. So there exists a derivation tree of R whose nodes are labeled by rules in aðbðIR init Þ; LÞ. We prove that the rule R t ¼ ½G t H t À½ B t ! e t labeled on the tree's root is also a contradiction as follows. Notice that R is a rule composed by R t with other rules, so G t 6 ¼ false and B t 6 ¼ ;.
If Q is a secrecy query, R t has a leakðmÞ event as conclusion because Q 0 R. Additionally, because
is a non-injective authentication query, e t should be an accept event. So, R t should satisfy either Q ' R t or Q 0 R t . Suppose we have Q ' R t . Since accept must be unifiable to e t , there exists a substitution s of e t and accept satisfying accept Á s ¼ e t , and 9s 0 ; ðH q Á s Á s 0 H t Á sÞ^ðB t Á s B q Á s Á s 0 Þ. Additionally, incoming edges of the tree root cannot be init or join events, so they should persist in R. Hence, Q ' R, which violates our precondition that Q 0 R. We then have Q 0 R t . (2) When Q is an injective authentication query, suppose we have a rule pair hR; R 0 i derivable from aðIR init ; LÞ such that Q 0 hR; R 0 i, in the following we prove that there exists a pair of rules hR b ; R 0 b i in aðbðIR init Þ; LÞ such that Q 0 hR b ; R 0 b i. According to Theorem 1, R and R 0 are also derivable from aðbðIR init Þ; LÞ. So there exist two derivation trees for R and R 0 respectively whose nodes are labeled by rules in aðbðIR init Þ; LÞ. Suppose the root nodes of these two trees are labeled by R t and R 0 t respectively. We have already proved that R t and R 0 t are obedience rules to non injðQÞ above. Given s is the substitution when the init events are merged in R and R 0 , it should also work when the init events are merged in R t and R 0 t . Because s cannot merge the accept events in R and R 0 , it cannot merge the accept events R t and R 0 t as well. Hence, we have Q 0 hR t ; R 0 t i t u
Remarks on Non-Termination. Since verifying security protocols is undecidable [20] , our algorithm cannot guarantee termination in general. In the following, we describe two common cases that can lead to non-termination.
One common cause of non-termination is the unbounded depth of function application, which is illustrated with Rules (2) and (3) below:
knowðfðxÞ; t 1 Þ À ½t 1 t ! knowðfðfðxÞÞ; tÞ
By composing Rules (2) to (3), we can get knowðfðxÞ; t 1 Þ À½ t 1 t ! knowðfðfðfðxÞÞÞ; tÞ;
which does not imply and is not implied by Rules (2) and (3). By composing Rule (2) to the newly generated rules repeatedly, we can get infinite many rules with increasing application depths of function f. Thus, the verification cannot terminate. Notice that, given a premise event knowða½; tÞ, the events obtainable from Rules (2) and (3) are knowða½; tÞ; knowðfðfða½ÞÞ; tÞ; knowðfðfðfða½ÞÞÞ; tÞ; . . . ;
where knowðfða½Þ; tÞ is missing in the list. On the contrary, when knowðfða½Þ; tÞ is in the list, Rules (2) and (3) can be replaced with knowðx; t 1 Þ À½ t 1 t ! knowðfðxÞ; tÞ; which does not have the non-termination problem.
Another common cause of non-termination is the unbounded numbers of freshly generated nonces in a session with unbounded timing constraints, which can be illustrated by Rules (4) and (5) below. Note that gð½n; tÞ has a limited lifetime within t þ xd knowðt 1 ; t 1 Þ; newð½n 1 ; l 1 ½Þ; uniqueð½n 1 ; l 1 ½; ht 1 ; h½n 1 ; riiÞ À½ t 1 t ! knowðgð½n 1 ; t 1 Þ; tÞ (4) knowðgðn i ; t i Þ; t 0 Þ; knowðt iþ1 ; t iþ1 Þ; newð½n iþ1 ; l 2 ½Þ; uniqueð½n iþ1 ; l 2 ½; hgðn i ; t i Þ; ht iþ1 ; h½n iþ1 ; riiiÞ À½ t 0 t^t iþ1 t t iþ1 À t i xd ! knowðgð½n iþ1 ; t iþ1 Þ; tÞ:
Rule (4) means that gð½n 1 ; t 1 Þ can be known after a nonce ½n 1 is generated. Rule (5) means that gð½n iþ1 ; t iþ1 Þ can be known for another fresh nonce ½n iþ1 after gðn i ; t 1 Þ is received within its lifetime t iþ1 À t i xd. We can compose Rules (4) to (5) as the following rule, which does not imply and is not implied by Rules (4) and (5) knowðt 1 ; t 1 Þ; newð½n 1 ; l 1 ½Þ; uniqueð½n 1 ; l 1 ½; ht 1 ; h½n 1 ; riiÞ; knowðt 2 ; t 2 Þ; newð½n 2 ; l 2 ½Þ; uniqueð½n 2 ; l 2 ½; hgð½n 1 ; t 1 Þ; ht 2 ; h½n 2 ; riiiÞ À½t 1 t^t 2 t^t 2 À t 1 xd ! knowðgð½n 2 ; t 2 Þ; tÞ:
It means that gð½n 2 ; t 2 Þ can be known after sending the result from Rules (4) to (5) . Notice that, comparing with gð½n 1 ; t 1 Þ in Rule (4), the lifetime of gð½n 2 ; t 2 Þ is extended. Since the results from the newly composed rules can always be sent to Rule (5), infinite many rules can be generated and thus the verification cannot terminate. In this case, by limiting the application times of Rule (5) in a session, the verification can become terminable. In our future works discussed in Section 8, we plan to develop a practical and generic abstraction method to help the non-terminable cases.
CASE STUDIES
Our verification framework has been implemented as a tool named Security Protocol Analyzer (available at [29] ), using C++ with 23K LoC . SPA relies on PPL [10] to check the satisfaction of timing constraints, i.e., in order to tell whether a generated rule is feasible or not. To improve the performance, SPA computes the rule basis on-the-fly by updating the parameter configuration as soon as a rule is generated. Hence, the verification process can terminate early if an attack is found. We have applied SPA to check multiple security protocols as shown in Table 5 . All the experiments are conducted using a Mac OS X 10.10.4 with 2.3 GHz Intel Core i5 and 16G 1333 MHz DDR3. In the experiments, we have checked several timed protocols i.e., the WMF protocols [6] , [7] , the Kerberos protocols [11] , the distance bounding protocol [3] , [4] and the CCITT protocols [6] , [23] , [24] . Additionally, we analyze the untimed protocols like the NeedhamSchroeder [25] , [26] and SKEME [28] . Most of the protocols can be verified or falsified quickly for an unbounded number of protocol sessions. Notice that the secure configuration is given based on the satisfaction of all of the queries, so we do not show the results for different queries separately in the table. Particularly, we have successfully found a new timed attack in Kerberos V [11] . Since Kerberos V is the latest version, we simply refer to it as Kerberos. In the following, we illustrate how SPA works with our running example first and then other protocols.
Wide Mouthed Frog
After checking WMF described in Section 2, an attack is found against the non-injective timed agreement. The two key rules in bðIR init Þ are shown below. Notice that we avoid generating a new nonce for the init event by reusing the existing session key ½k as the session id of P a . Since any nonce generated in the current session can act as its session id, this simplification does not weaken nor strengthen our method. More importantly, it makes the rules much easier to read. Rule (6) represents the execution trace that the server transmits the request from Alice to Bob for once. It is obedient to the non-injective timed agreement query (1). However, rule (7) represents a possible execution trace that contradicts the query (1). Compared with the timing constraint 't b t a þ 2 Â xp m ' in the query, rule (7) has a weaker timing range 't b t a þ 4 Â xp m ' if xp m > 0. This rule stands for the execution trace that the adversary sends the message from the server back to server twice and then forwards it to Bob as follows, where K is the adversary.
(1) A generates a random session key k at t a A p m B accepts the session key k According to the process P s , the timestamp in the message can be updated in this method. Hence, Bob would not notice that the message is actually delayed when he receives it. In order to remove the contradiction rule, we need to configure the parameters as either xp m < xp n or xp m 0. However, applying any of these constraints to the initial configuration xp n > 0 leads to the removal of rule (6) 
s þ xp n t b ! acceptð½n; hA½; B½; ½ki; t b Þ:
Corrected WMF for Non-Injective Timed Agreement. The attack of WMF is caused by the symmetric structure of the messages that are sent and received by the server, so the adversary can send the messages from the server back to the server. Hence, this attack can be defended by inserting two different constants m 1 and m 2 into the messages that are sent and received by the server respectively [3] , [4] Yes No 53 Secure 36 ms CCITT X.509 (1) [23] No No 92 Attack [24] 114 ms CCITT X.509 (1c) [24] No No 101 Secure 119 ms CCITT X.509 (3) [23] No No 433 Attack [6] 1,943 ms CCITT X.509 (3) BAN [6] No No 298 Secure 887 ms NS PK [25] No No 123 Attack [26] 94 ms NS PK Lowe [26] No No 150 Secure 89 ms NS PK Commitment [27] No Then, the server can distinguish the messages that it sent out previously, and refuse to process them again. Our algorithm proves the non-injective timed agreement of this modified WMF protocol and produces the timing constraints 0 < xp n xp m with rule (6). However, given two instances of rule (6) with the same session key ½k, we cannot conclude that they have identical ½n. This violates the third condition of Algorithm 1, so the injective timed agreement of WMF is still unsatisfied.
Corrected WMF for Injective Timed Agreement. In fact, there exist two methods to modify the WMF protocol so that the injective timed agreement can be satisfied.
In the first approach that we proposed, Bob can maintain a database that stores the previously used session keys to avoid duplicate requests. When a new request is received, Bob checks the new session key ½k in database db as unique to ensure that it has not been used before Hence, any session key generated by Alice can only be accepted by Bob for once (i.e., injective). In the corresponding timed logic rule, an additional premise uniqueð½k; db½; henc s ðht s ; A½; ½k; m 2 ½i; keyðB½ÞÞ; ht b ; h½n; r b iiiÞ is added. When two rules use the same '½k', the unique events then have the same signature 'unique:½k:db½', leading to the unification of session id '½n'. So, the injective timed agreement can be verified in our framework.
In the second approach [26] , we add another round of communications between the protocol initiator and the protocol responder. Before Bob engages the accept event in the process P b , Bob can generate a fresh nonce n b and send it back to Alice under the newly agreed encryption key k. When Alice receives the nonce n b , she send incðn b Þ back to Bob, where incðxÞ increases x by 1 Since Alice only replies once, Bob then can make sure the authentication is injective. During the verification, the unique event of k ensures that at most one n b will be accepted by Aliceand the unique event of n b ensures that Bob will establish at most one session for every n b . Thus, the injective timed agreement can be proved in our framework.
Commitment Protocols
In commitment protocols, a nonce are often sent out at the end of the protocol session as a proof to the commitment made previously. Since the nonce generated in the legitimated process is unpredictable to the adversary, the adversary cannot get the proof before it is sent out by the process. Consider the following process P , where s is a secret constant that should not be known to the adversary and c 0 is a public channel name P , nn:c 0 ðxÞ:c 0 ðnÞ:ifx ¼ n then c 0 ðsÞ:secrecyðsÞ:0:
Since P receives the message x before it sends out the nonce n, the checking condition x ¼ n can never be satisfied and the secrecy property of s should be preserved. This process P is initially proposed in [18] to illustrate possible false alarms in ProVerif [13] , and later used in [27] as an example of verifying commitment protocols. According to [18] , [27] , ProVerif returns false alarms because it makes over-approximation to nonces. In order to remove the false alarms, Tom et al. [27] proposed to add phases into the protocol execution. Comparing with their approach, our framework can natively prove the secrecy property of s in the process P , because no abstraction is made to the nonces during the verification. Additionally, we use our method to verify Needham-Schroeder protocol with commitment [27] successfully.
More importantly, since the protocol participants can explicitly engage open events to reveal secret messages, we can model commitment protocols in a more straight forward manner. For instance, we can verify the secrecy property in the following process P 0 , which is infeasible by adding phases in ProVerif [27] P 0 , nn:secrecyðnÞ:openðnÞ:c 0 ðnÞ:0:
To be specific, the following two timed logic rules can be extracted from P 0 newð½n; gen½Þ; uniqueð½n; gen½; h½n; riÞ; knowð½n; tÞ À½ !leakð½nÞ (8) newð½n; gen½Þ; uniqueð½n; gen½; h½n; riÞ; openð½nÞ À½ !knowð½n; tÞ:
After composing rules (9) to (8) on the know event, we find that the leakð½nÞ event is only reachable with the openð½nÞ event engaged before. So the secrecy property of the nonce n in P 0 is preserved.
Kerberos
Kerberos is a widely used security protocol for accessing services. For instance, Microsoft Window uses Kerberos as its default authentication method; many UNIX and UNIXlike operating systems include software for Kerberos authentication. Kerberos has a salient property such that its user can obtain accesses to a network service within a period of time using a single request. In general, this is achieved by granting an access ticket to the user, so that the user can subsequently use this ticket to complete authentication to the server. Kerberos is complex because multiple ticket operations are supported simultaneously and many fields are optional, which are heavily relying on time. So, configuring Kerberos is hard and error-prone. Kerberos consists of five types of entities: User, Client, Kerberos Authentication Server (KAS), Ticket Granting Server (TGS) and Application Server (AP). KAS and TGS together are also known as Key Distribution Centre (KDC). Specifically, Users usually are humans, and Clients represent their identities in the Kerberos network. KAS is the place where a User can initiate a logon session to the Kerberos network with a pre-registered Client. In return, KAS provides the User with (1) a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and (2) an encrypted session key as the authorization proof to access TGS. After TGS checks the authorization from KAS, TGS issues two similar credentials (1) a Service Ticket (ST) and (2) a new encrypted session key to the User as authorization proof to access AP. Then, the User can finally use them to retrieve the Service from AP. Additionally, both of the TGT and the ST can be postdated, validated and renewed by KDC when these operations are permitted in the Kerberos network.
Specification Highlights. Generally, by following the method described in Section 2, the specification for Kerberos itself can be modeled easily. In order to verify Kerberos comprehensively, we model several keys and timestamps (which could be optional) by following its official document RFC 4120 [11] precisely.
The user and the server are allowed to specify subsession keys in the messages. When a sub-session key is specified, the message receiver must use it to transmit the next message rather than using the default session-key. Optional timestamps are allowed in the user requests and the tickets. In the following, t fq , t tq and t rq denote the start-time, the end-time and the maximum renewable end-time requested by the users. Similarly, t sp , t ep and t rp denote the start-time, the end-time and the maximum renewable end-time agreed by the servers. t sp , t ep and t rp are encoded in the tickets, corresponding to t fq , t tq and t rq respectively. An additional timestamp ap is encoded in the ticket to represent the initial authentication time of the ticket. Furthermore, t cq represents the currenttime when the request is made by the user, and t cp stands for the current-time when the ticket is issued by the server. In Kerberos, t fq , t rq , t sp and t rp are optional. So the servers need to check their presence and construct replies accordingly. In the Kerberos model, two parameters are considered in Kerberos, i.e., the maximum lifetime xl and the maximum renewable lifetime xr of the tickets. Based on these parameters, the servers can only issue tickets whose lifetime and renewable lifetime are shorter than xl and xr respectively. Furthermore, five operations are modeled for the Kerberos servers as follows. (1) Postdated tickets can be generated for future usage. They are marked as invalid initially and they must be validated later. (2) Postdated tickets must be validated before usage. (3) Renewable tickets can be renewed before they expire. (4) Initial tickets are generated at KAS using user's client. (5) Sub-tickets are generated at TGS using existing tickets. Notice that the end-time t ep of the sub-ticket should be no larger than the end-time of the existing ticket. The Kerberos model is available in [29] .
Queries. In order to specify the queries, we define three events as follows.
When an initial ticket is generated at KAS, an init auth ðhk; u; siÞ@t event is engaged, where k is the fresh session key, u is the client's name, s is the target server's name, and t is the beginning of the ticket's lifetime. Whenever a new ticket is generated at KAS or TGS, an init gen ðhk; u; siÞ@t event is engaged. Its arguments have the same meaning as those in init auth . Whenever a ticket is accepted by the server, an acceptðhk; u; siÞ@t event is engaged, where k is the agreed session key, u is the client's name, s is the current server's name, and t is the acceptance time. In Kerberos, we need to ensure the correctness of two noninjective timed agreements. First, whenever a server accepts a ticket, the ticket should be indeed generated within xl time units using the same session key. Second, whenever a server accepts a ticket, the initial ticket should be indeed generated within xr time units. Notice that the injective timed agreement is unnecessary in Kerberos because it is intended to allow the users to authenticate themselves to the servers for multiple times by using the same unexpired authorization proof acceptðhk; u; siÞ@t ½ t À t 
Verification Results. For the termination of the verification, we need to initially configure the parameters as xr < x Ã xl, where x can be any integer larger than 1. The requirement for this constraint is justified as follows. Algorithm 1 updates parameter configuration at line 15 to eliminate the contradiction rules. Suppose we have a rule init auth ðhk; C; Si; t 0 Þ À½ t À t 0 y Ã xl ! acceptðhk; C; Si; tÞ in the rule basis, where y > 1. This rule is a contradiction to the query (11) because xr is not necessarily larger than y Ã xl. However, Algorithm 1 can add a new constraint y Ã xl xr to the existing configuration and then continue searching. Since we have infinitely many such rules in bðIR init Þ with different values of y, the verification cannot terminate. Hence, in this work, we set the initial configuration as xr < 2 Ã xl to avoid the non-termination. Notice that this initial configuration does not prevent us from finding attacks because it does not limit the number of sequential operations allowed in the Kerberos protocol.
By using SPA, we have successfully found a security flaw in its specification document RFC 4120 [11] . The attack trace is depicted in Fig. 2 obtained a renewable ticket at time 0. Then, she can request for a sub-ticket of AP at time 2 that is renewable until time 7, satisfying t rq1 À t cp1 xr. Notice the new sub-ticket's endtime t ep2 cannot be larger than the end-time t ep1 of the existing ticket. Later, she renews the new sub-ticket before it expires and gets a ticket valid until time 6. Finally, she requests the service at time 6 and engages an event acceptðh½k 3 ; A½; AP ½i; 6Þ. However, this accept event does not correspond to any init auth event satisfying Query (11), which leads to an attack. In fact, Alice can use this method to request sub-ticket for AP repeatedly so that she can have access to the service forever. Obviously, the server who made the authentication initially does not intend to do so. Fortunately, after checking the source code of Kerberos, we find that this flaw is prevented in its implementations [30] , [31] . An additional check 3 has been inserted to regulate that the renewable lifetime in the sub-ticket should be smaller than the renewable lifetime in the existing ticket. We later confirmed with Kerberos team that this is an error in its specification document, which could have led to a security issue but has not done so in its current implementation.
Corrected Version. After adding the timing constraints on renewable lifetime between the base-ticket and the sub-ticket, the verification cannot terminate. This is caused by an infinite dependency trace formed by tickets, as we do not limit its length. Hence, we bound the number of tickets that can be generated during the verification, which in turn bounds the number of init gen events in the rule. In this work, we bound the ticket number to five. This is justified as we have five different methods to generate tickets in Kerberos: the servers can postdate, validate, renew tickets, generate initial tickets and issue sub-tickets. After bounding the ticket number that can be generated, our tool proves the correctness of Kerberos and produces the configuration 0 xl xr < 2 Ã xl.
RELATED WORKS
We discuss the related works from the following aspects.
Extensions from Previous Works. This work is a substantial extension of [1] , [2] . In this work, we additionally introduce the timed applied p-calculus as an intuitive specification language for timed security protocols. In order to verify the protocols specified in timed applied p-calculus automatically, we further define its semantics based on the timed logic rules [1] , [2] . Furthermore, we extend our framework to verify the injective timed authentication and stronger secrecy properties. During the evaluation, we rewrite all of the existing case studies in [1] , [2] using timed applied p-calculus. More importantly, we add several new case studies to show our extensions, e.g., the injective version of Wide Mouthed Frog protocol and the commitment protocols.
Timed Related Security Protocol Verification. The analyzing framework closest to ours was proposed by Delzanno and Ganty [7] which applies MSRðLÞ to specify unbounded crypto protocols by combining first order multiset rewriting rules and linear constraints. According to [7] , the protocol specification is modified by explicitly encoding an additional timestamp, representing the initialization time, into some messages. Thus the attack can be found by comparing the original timestamps with the new one in the messages. However, it is unclear how to verify timed protocol in general using their approach. On the other hand, our approach can be applied to protocols without any protocol modification. Additionally, a verification method was proposed in [32] to verify timed equivalence property for untimed protocols. It verification result ensures that the adversary cannot observe differences between protocol executions considering time. Notice that timed operations, e.g., reading, using and comparing timestamps, cannot be specified using their verification method. Hence, their work is proposed for a different security analysis goal comparing with SPA. Furthermore, [33] was proposed to find timed attacks in cyberphysical security protocols, considering dense time and 3. For krb5-1.13 from MIT, the checking is located in the file src/ kdc/kdc_util.c at line 1740 -1741. We also checked other implementations, like heimdal-1.5.2.
processing circle. Comparing with their work, we do not consider the attacks that could be introduced by specific physical properties, like processing circle, at present. Instead, we aims at finding the logic flaws introduced by the cryptography application with time.
Kerberos Verification. Kerberos has been scrutinized over years using formal methods. In [34] , Bella et al. analyzed Kerberos IV using the Isabelle theorem prover. They checked various secrecy and authentication properties and took time into consideration. However, Kerberos is largely simplified in their analysis and the specification method in their work is not as intuitive as ours. Later, Kerberos V has been analyzed by Mitchell et al. [35] using state exploration tool Mur'. They claimed that an attack is found in [36] when two servers exist. However, this attack is actually infeasible in Kerberos's official specification document RFC 1510 [37] . The Kerberos specification RFC 4120 [11] analyzed in this work later superseded RFC 1510. Compared with the state exploration approach [35] , our method can verify protocols with an unbounded number of sessions. Additionally, the above literatures do not consider alternative options supported in Kerberos that may accidentally introduce attacks. Similar to our work, Kerberos V has been analyzed in a theorem proving context by Butler et al. [38] . They took many features into consideration, i.e., the error messages, the encryption types and the cross-realm support. These features are not covered in our work since we focus on the timestamps and timing constraint checking. Meanwhile, our framework can provide intuitive modeling and automatic verifying, whereas Kerberos V is analyzed manually in [38] .
Untimed Security Protocol Verifiers. Many tools are proposed to verify untimed protocols, e.g., ProVerif [13] , Athena [14] , Scyther [22] and Tamarin [21] . ProVerif [13] and our tool SPA both use Horn logic rules to represent the protocol execution. Horn logic reasoning makes the verification process extremely efficient compared with others. ProVerif relies on the nonce abstraction [13] . SPA does not have the nonce abstraction and guarantees partial correctness for its verification result, which makes it suitable for verifying timed protocols and commitment protocols. Athena [14] and Scyther [22] use strand space for the protocol verification, and Tamarin [21] uses multiset rewriting rules. Comparing with our method, strand space and multiset rewriting rules consider the protocol execution as non-monotonic. Hence, they are suitable for specifying compromised adversaries [39] and verifying stateful protocols [40] , [41] .
Timed Modeling Languages. Many languages have been proposed to model timed systems and protocols, e.g., Timed Automata [42] , [43] , Timed CSP [44] . Furthermore, many verification tools have been proven successful, e.g., Uppaal [45] , KRONOS [46] . However, they are not suitable for modeling timed security protocols for the following reasons. First, they are initially proposed for timed systems and protocols without the adversary. Adding the adversary is non-trivial, e.g., the events and the channel communications do not need to be synchronized in the protocol model considering the presence of the adversary. Furthermore, these models are often verified by model checking for a bounded number of processes using state-space traversal searching algorithm, which is not applicable to security protocol verification that typically requires checking an unbounded number of processes. More importantly, applied p-calculus [12] is a widely-used security protocol modeling language in the security community [13] , [41] , [47] . Hence, we extend applied p-calculus with time to model timed security protocols.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this work, we developed an automatic verification framework for timed parameterized security protocols. It can verify authentication properties as well as secrecy properties for an unbounded number of protocol sessions. We have implemented our approach into a tool named SPA and used it to analyze a wide range of protocols shown in Section 6. In the experiments, we have found a timed attack in Kerberos V document that has never been reported before.
Since the problem of verifying security protocols is undecidable in general, we cannot guarantee the termination of our verification algorithm. When we use SPA to analyze the corrected version of Kerberos, SPA cannot terminate because of the infinite dependency chain of tickets. Hence, we have to bound the number of tickets generated in the protocol. However, in Kerberos, generating more tickets may not be helpful to break its security. Based on this observation, we want to detect and prune the non-terminable verification branches heuristically without affecting the final results in our future work. This could help us to verify large-sized and complex protocols that we cannot verify currently, as our verification algorithm only considers the general approach at present. Furthermore, comparing with other process algebraic languages, e.g., CSP, other time operations like timeout, interruption are supported. They could be useful in security protocol design and specification. Hence, we plan to extend the timed applied p-calculus with these timed operations in our future works. Moreover, considering other related properties, e.g., observational equivalence [32] , [48] , forward secrecy [49] , [50] , in the timing domain, could be interesting as well. Hence, we plan to extend SPA with more verification supports for complex security properties and strong adversary models in our future works. " For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
